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Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage
between R&D and Climate Cooperation
1.  Introduction
In the last few decades, international and global environmental issues have become an important concern of
the international community. Among the variety of environmental challenges, climate change is considered
as one of the most serious threats to the sustainability of the world socio-economic system. In order to tackle
global environmental problems in the most effective way, as many countries as possible -- or at least a
number of countries which account for a large share of total emissions -- have to take action. However, no
supra-national authority capable of enforcing environmental policies and regulations yet exists. Therefore,
environmental protection can only be achieved via international agreements among sovereign countries.
The international political response to climate change was introduced within the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which was adopted in 1992. In 1997, the UNFCCC agreed to
the Kyoto Protocol, setting for the first time binding emissions reduction targets for industrialised countries.
In particular, by 2012 the world wide greenhouse gas emissions should decline by an average 5,2% below
their 1990 levels. The Kyoto Protocol represents remarkable progress in the history of international
environmental agreements and its implementation could lay the basis for effective global action. However,
the Kyoto Protocol determined only the targets, methods and timetables for global action, while the
definition of specific rules and operational details was postponed to later meetings. This is one of the reasons
why the Protocol has not yet entered into force: many countries signed the Protocol, but few actually ratified
it
1.
After the  political deal concluded in Bonn, an agreement on the outstanding “technical” issues could be
reached in Marrakech within the 7
th Conference to the Parties. The majority of the missing details relating to
the structure of the Kyoto Protocol have been negotiated, thereby clearing the way for the Protocol’s
“timely” entry into force. After heavy concessions had been made to some of the countries (above all to
Russia), an agreement on the operational details for commitments on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) has been finalised. Therefore, the road for the Kyoto Protocol ratification and implementation seems
to be paved.
Notwithstanding this success, international climate policy suffers a major problem: the world largest
economy, the United States, does not wish to play a part in the Kyoto/Bonn/Marrakech Protocol. Although
                                                
1 The ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol as of March 5
th, 2002: 84 countries signed the Kyoto Protocol (and
accepted it in this way officially), but only 48 countries (mainly small island states) ratified it. For recent updates see
http://www.unfccc.de/resource/kpstats.pdf.3
being a party to the UNFCCC, in March 2001 the US President George W. Bush announced the US
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol due to the harm that this climate agreement would incur on the US
economy. After this official statement, the US did not take part in the subsequent negotiations on the
Protocol.
A recent strand of literature (see Buchner, Carraro and  Cersosimo, 2001, for a summary) analyses the
consequences of the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Three main effects are highlighted:
¤  The US rejection and the new provisions included in the Marrakech agreement imply a strong decline in
the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.
¤  The US defection induces a decreasing demand for emission permits and consequently a decline in the
permit price, thus reducing the incentives to abate emissions and invest in climate friendly technologies
in all countries.
2
¤  The smaller permit price after the US defection reduces Russia’s benefits from participating in the Kyoto
agreement. This provides additional incentives for Russia to use its increased bargaining power in
climate negotiations.
3
Therefore, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol induces serious environmental and economic
problems, ranging from a deterioration of the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol to the increase in
Russia’s bargaining power. As a consequence, the need to involve the US again in the international efforts to
combat climate change is strengthened.
As shown by these recent events, broad participation on environmental issues is hard to achieve. This
conclusion is also supported by theoretical findings. There are probably two main reasons which explain the
difficulty for countries to sign an environmental agreement. The first is the large economic and
environmental asymmetries among world regions. These structural differences induce a difficulty to share
the burden of emission reductions in a way that makes it convenient for most countries to sign the agreement.
The second reason is the intrinsic instability of environmental negotiations: even in the absence of
asymmetries, some countries may prefer to free-ride, i.e. to profit from the cleaner environment provided by
signatory countries, without paying the costs (because environmental benefits are not excludable: climate
change control is a global public good).
                                                
2 Some studies highlight feedback effects that can mitigate the fall in the permit price. Strategic market behaviours can indeed
modify the size of the expected changes in prices and abatement costs. In particular, these changes are much smaller than initially
suggested. For example, banking and monopolistic behaviour in the permit market (Manne and Richels, 2001; Den Elzen and de
Moor, 2001; Böhringer, 2001b) or strategic R&D behaviour (Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo, 2001) can offset the demand shift and
reduce the decline of the permit price consequent to the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.
3 A precondition for the Kyoto Protocol to become enforced is that at least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing at the same
time at least 55% of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions of Annex B Parties, must have ratified the treaty. After the US withdrew from
the Protocol, the participation of Russia has thus become crucial. The recent outcome of the COP 7 in Marrakech includes
considerable concessions to Russia and thereby confirms Russia’s increased bargaining power.4
For these reasons, an important strand of literature is focused on policy strategies that can increase
environmental cooperation (see Carraro and Siniscalco, 2002; Carraro and Galeotti, 2002 for recent surveys).
The main economic mechanisms that have been proposed to induce more countries to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol are transfers and “issue linkage”, even though negotiation rules and treaty design can also be used
to enlarge the equilibrium size of environmental coalitions (Carraro, 2000).
It is quite natural to propose transfers to compensate those countries which may lose out by signing the
environmental agreement. The idea is that a redistribution mechanism among signatories, from gainers to
losers, may provide the basic requirement for a self-enforcing agreement to exist: the profitability of the
agreement for all countries. Transfers also play a major role with respect to the stability issue. The possibility
of using self-financed transfers to offset free-riding incentives, i.e. to stabilise environmental agreements, is
analysed in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Hoel (1994), who show that transfers may be successful only if
associated with a certain degree of commitment. When countries are symmetric, only if a group of countries
is committed to cooperation, another group of uncommitted countries can be induced to sign the agreement
by a system of transfers.
4
However, transfers are hardly ever adopted in actual climate negotiations. One reason is that payments must
be provided in advance and this can induce strategic behaviour both in signatories and non-signatories
countries. In other words, cooperating players could under-estimate their initial gains in order to decrease the
amount of transfers they must provide; while on the other hand, free-riders could over-estimate their loss in
order to obtain a larger amount of financial transfers.
For these reasons, both the economic and the political science literature on international environmental
agreements propose an alternative approach to increase the number of signatories of an international
agreement. The alternative approach, called  issue linkage, is based on the idea that countries may have
incentives to free ride on a global public good, but these incentives become much smaller if negotiations on
the global public good are linked with negotiations on another economic issue (typically a club good whose
benefits cannot be reaped by free-riders).
Therefore, issue linkage consists in designing a negotiation framework in which countries do not negotiate
on just one issue (e.g. the environmental issue), but negotiate on two joint issues (e.g. the environmental one
and another interrelated economic issue).
Pioneering contributions on issue linkage are those by  Tollison and  Willett (1979), Haas (1980) and
Sebenius (1983). They propose this mechanism to promote cooperation not only on environmental matters,
but also on other issues, e.g. security and international finance. They also emphasise the increase in
transaction costs that can result from the use of issue linkage.
                                                
4 This constraint is weaker in the case of asymmetric countries (see Botteon and Carraro, 1997a).5
Issue linkage was introduced in the economic literature on international environmental cooperation by
Folmer et al. (1993) and by Cesar and De Zeeuw (1996) to solve the problem of asymmetries among
countries. The intuition is simple: if some countries gain on a given issue and other countries gain on a
second one, by linking the two issues we can obtain a profitable agreement for all countries.
However, issue linkage can also be used to mitigate the problem of free-riding. To do this, negotiations that
are affected by this problem, i.e. negotiations concerning public goods, must be linked with negotiations on
club or quasi-club goods. The intuition is that the incentives to free-ride on the non-excludable benefits of
the public good can be offset by the incentives to appropriate the excludable benefits given by jointly
providing a club good.
Barrett (1995, 1997), for example, proposes to link environmental protection to negotiations on trade
liberalisation. In this way, potential free-riders are deterred with threats of trade sanctions. In Carraro and
Siniscalco (1995, 1997) and Katsoulacos (1997), environmental cooperation is linked to cooperation in
Research and Development. If a country does not cooperate on the control of the environment, it looses the
benefits of technological cooperation.  Mohr (1995) and  Mohr et al. (1998) propose to link climate
negotiations to international debt swaps. All these contributions have shown, from a theoretical point of
view, the effectiveness of issue linkage in increasing the equilibrium number of cooperators on the provision
of the public good.
The goal of this paper is to analyse whether the linkage of cooperation on climate change control with
cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion can help by moving the US back to Kyoto. Namely,
whether the possibility of getting R&D cooperation benefits, which can be obtained only through
cooperation on climate change control, constitutes a sufficient incentive for the US to comply with the Kyoto
targets.
This paper explores this idea by analysing on the one hand the incentives for the European Union (EU),
Japan (JPN) and Russia (FSU) to adopt the issue linkage strategy, and on the other hand the incentives for
the US to join a coalition which cooperates both on GHG emission control and on R&D investment and
technological diffusion. The extended regime in which cooperation takes place on both dimensions (climate
and R&D) will be examined from the view point of countries’ profitability and free-riding incentives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide some evidence of the small environmental
effectiveness of the Bonn/Marrakech agreement without the US. We also discuss some feedback effects
arising as a consequence of the US withdrawal from the Kyoto agreement. In section 3, we identify the
theoretical conditions for issue linkage to induce the US to move back to Kyoto. Then, in section 4, by using
the RICE model with endogenous and induced technical change -- the so-called ETC-RICE model -- we
verify whether these conditions are actually met in reality (as far as reality is represented by our model).
Our results do not seem to support the linkage between climate and R&D cooperation as an effective strategy
to induce the US to accept and ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, we explore another climate regime,6
recently proposed by Barrett (2001), in which countries cooperate only on technological innovation and
diffusion, without any binding abatement commitment. Using again the ETC-RICE model, in section 5 we
assess the environmental and economic benefits of this proposal. A concluding section summarises the main
achievements of this paper and describes future research directions.
2.  Environmental and economic benefits of US cooperation
As already outlined in the Introduction, the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol has three
important consequences
5: (i) it reduces the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol; (ii) it lowers the
incentives to undertake energy-saving R&D, and (iii) it increases the bargaining power of permit suppliers,
Russia in particular.
Let us provide some empirical evidence to support the above conclusions. The US withdrawal from Kyoto
reduces the demand for GHG emission permits. Therefore, the equilibrium price in the permit market is
lower. This lower price reduces the costs of complying with the Kyoto Protocol in the remaining Annex B
countries, but it also lowers their total amount of emission abatement through leakage effects. In addition, the
incentives to undertake environmental-friendly R&D and technological innovation are lowered.
The effects of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol on the price of GHG emission permits
and on the related compliance costs are shown in Table 1, which summarises the results obtained in several
recent studies. Table 1 shows that the aforementioned effects on the permit price and on compliance costs
can be quite relevant.
Table 2 summarises recent empirical evidence on the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto/Bonn
Protocol after the US decision not to comply with the targets set in Kyoto. It is clear that the emission
abatement achieved by the remaining Annex B countries is much lower than the –5,2% agreed upon in
Kyoto. The reason for this result is obvious. The US represent the world’s largest economy. Its CO2
emissions made up about 32% of the industrialised countries’ emissions in 1990 and are thus responsible for
a large share of global GHG emissions. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol imposes a particularly stringent
emission target on the US. In order to meet its Kyoto target of -7% -- which is higher than the average -5,2%
for  industrialised countries as a whole -- the US would have to reduce their GHG emissions by 25-30% in
2010. Therefore, the US defection from the Kyoto agreement implies the impossibility in achieving the 5,2%
global target.
                                                
5 See for example Böhringer (2001), Böhringer and Löschel (2001), Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo (2001), Den Elzen and de Moor
(2002), Den Elzen and de Moor (2001a, 2001b), Den Elzen and Manders (2001) Egenhofer, Hager and Legge (2001), Egenhofer and
Legge (2001), Eyckmans, van Regemorter and van Steenberghe (2001), Hagem and Holtsmark (2001), Jensen (2001), Kopp (2001),
Kemfert (2001), Manne and Richels (2001), and Vrolijk (2001).7
Table 1. Implications of the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Changes of permit price and
  compliance costs in 2010.
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* Percentage changes are computed with respect to the values of permit price and compliance costs in the case in which the US is
   assumed to comply with the Kyoto Protocol.
** This paper assumes that the US will start complying with its Kyoto emissions constraint in 2020.
*** This result is an updated and corrected version of the analysis in Den Elzen and de Moor (2001b).8
Table 2. Implications of the U.S. withdrawal on environmental effectiveness
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All studies apply international emissions trading.
1 The targets for 2010 imposed by the Kyoto Protocol are related to base year emissions levels,
not to the 1990-levels. Therefore, all these studies compare the simulations for emission
reductions with respect to the BAU situation in 2010.
2 Percentage change with respect to the BAU of total Annex B emissions in 2010, including the
US emissions.
3 This analysis compares the CO2 emissions to the 1990-levels.
4 Excluding the US emissions from the Annex B would imply a reduction in the Annex B
emissions of - 4% compared to 1990-levels
5 This paper uses CO2 equivalent emissions to reflect abatement efforts.
6 This value does not include the US emissions.9
In addition, Table 2 suggests that the remaining Annex B countries would react to the US decision by
increasing their own emissions. This prediction seems to be confirmed by the recent outcome of the
Marrakech Conference of the Parties, where additional sink provisions have been established which reduce
the environmental effectiveness of the Treaty. At the same time, the emissions market loses its largest permit
demander, which implies that there is a higher amount of hot air available for the remaining Annex B
countries and that the permit price falls. This reduces the cost of energy in the remaining Annex B countries,
thus mitigating potential impacts on energy demand (which could possibly  rise).
Other studies, in addition to those quoted in Table 2, achieve similar conclusions. Eyckmans et al. (2001)
find that in 2010 world carbon emissions would increase by 25.5% with respect to 1990 compared to an
increase of 15.5% if the Kyoto Protocol is implemented including the US. Similar conclusions can be found
also in Kemfert (2001), Kopp (2001) and Vrolijk (2001).
6
The impact on R&D expenditure and consequently on technology and the emission/output ratio of the US
decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol has recently been studied by Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo
(2001), where a model with endogenous and induced technical change is used. In this paper, the effect of the
lower permit price on the incentives to undertake GHG emission reducing R&D are quantified. The results
are summarised in Table 3, which confirms the decline of R&D expenditure in all Annex B countries after
the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol.
Table 3. Implication of the US withdrawal on the amount of R&D
Changes of R&D expenditure in percentage
(Annex B without USA compared to original Annex B)
USA JPN EU FSU
2010 - 9.7% - 0.3% - 0.6% - 8.3%
2020 - 12.0% - 0.3% - 0.7% - 7.9%
2030 - 13.7% - 0.4% - 0.8% - 6.7%
2040 - 15.0% - 0.3% - 0.7% - 5.0%
2050 - 15.7% - 0.2% - 0.5% - 3.1%
                                                
6 Including the effects of the Marrakech Agreement reached at the Seventh Conference of the Parties, the decrease in the world
abatement is even stronger: Den Elzen and de Moor (2001a, 2002) includes the Marrakech provisions and find that the Annex B CO2
equivalent emissions actually increase by almost 2% with respect to the 1990-level.10
Therefore, not only does the US reduce their abatement and R&D efforts, but also those of the other Annex
B countries, via spillovers and leakage effects. As a consequence, the emission/output ratio deteriorates in all
Annex B countries (Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo, 2001).
Finally, the US decision, by inducing a fall in the permit price, penalises the permit sellers, namely Russia,
which loses most of its benefits from participating in the Kyoto agreement (given hot air, a lower permit
price strongly reduces Russia’s possible windfall profits). However, being the dominant seller, Russia could
be tempted to use the banking provision and its monopolistic power to raise the price of permits (Manne and
Richels, 2001)
  7. Given the low benefits from emission trading, Russia could even question its participation
in the Kyoto Protocol.
This latter threat is reinforced by one of the rules of the Kyoto Protocol, which requires that at least 55
Parties to the Convention, representing at the same time at least 55% of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions of
Annex B countries, must ratify the Protocol for it to enter into force. Russia is well aware of its importance
as a key player for the agreement implementation. As a consequence, its bargaining power has sharply
increased after the US defection from Kyoto. This increased bargaining power has enabled Russia to obtain
important concessions in Marrakech, which further reduce the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol.
The above evidence supports our search for negotiation and policy strategies designed to provide new
incentives for the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It is indeed crucial to bring the US back into the
international climate regime. Without the US contribution no effective emission reductions can be achieved.
8
Can “issue linkage”, and in particular the linkage between climate and R&D cooperation, be the right policy
tool to induce the US to move back to Kyoto?
3.  Can “issue linkage” induce US cooperation? A game-theoretic approach
Let us briefly describe the game-theoretic model upon which our empirical analysis will be based (see
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997, or Carraro and  Marchiori, 2001, for a detailed presentation). Assume
negotiations take place among n countries, n ‡3, each indexed by  i = 1, ..., n. Countries play a two-stage
game. In the first stage -- the coalition game -- they decide non-cooperatively whether or not to sign the
agreement (i.e. to join the coalition). In the second stage, they play a non-cooperative open loop Nash game
to set their policy variables (emission abatement rate, investments, R&D expenditure). In the second stage,
                                                
7 Other studies which have addressed the possibility of strategic behaviour on the supply side of the permit market are:
Böhringer (2001), Böhringer and Löschel (2001),  Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo (2001), Den Elzen and de Moor
(2002, 2001a, 2001b), Egenhofer, Hager and Legge (2001), Eyckmans, van Regemorter and van Steenberghe (2001).
8 In addition, without the US commitment to reduce their own emissions, developing countries are very unlikely to join
the Annex B group.11
countries which signed the agreement play as a single player and divide the resulting payoff according to a
given burden-sharing rule.
9
In the empirical model described in the next section, the players are six macro-regions: Europe (EU), Japan
(JPN), Former Soviet Union (FSU), United States (US), China (CHN) and Rest of the World (ROW). The
starting point of our analysis is the existing climate regime. Therefore, we assume that EU, JPN and FSU are
committed to comply with the Kyoto Protocol (even though they have not yet ratified it), namely their
abatement rate is such to achieve the Kyoto target. In the second stage, these countries optimally set their
investments and R&D expenditure. In contrast, the other countries -- US, CHN and ROW -- maximise their
own welfare function with respect to their investments, R&D expenditure and also their abatement rate.
Assume that EU, JPN and FSU identify issue linkage as a strategy to induce the US to accept and ratify the
Kyoto Protocol. In particular they want to link climate and R&D cooperation. Is this strategy effective?
The issue linkage proposal that EU, JPN and FSU are assumed to make to the US is as follows. All four
countries are offered to cooperate on both climate change control and technological innovation and diffusion.
If a country free-rides either on climate cooperation or on R&D cooperation (or on both), it keeps the
environmental benefits (because climate control is a public good) but looses the R&D cooperation benefits
(at least partly, because of technological spillovers). Is this proposal credible?
Note that the incentives to free-ride on the climate agreement come from the public good nature of climate
change control, whereas the incentives to free-ride on the R&D agreement arise from the presence of
technological spillovers. Therefore, R&D cooperation is assumed to be an imperfect club good. As suggested
by theoretical works (Cf. Carraro and Marchiori, 2001), we will see that the parameter which identifies
technological spillovers plays a crucial role in the analysis of the effectiveness and credibility of the issue
linkage proposal.
Let us identify the theoretical conditions which are necessary and sufficient for the joint agreement, in which
all four countries, including the US, cooperate on both climate and R&D, to be profitable and stable.
10 We
will focus on the first stage of the game, in which all countries decide whether or not to cooperate on climate
and R&D. It is important to recall that the environmental coalition (EU, JPN, FSU) is assumed to be
committed to comply with the Kyoto targets. However, they can set their technological variables in a non
cooperative way, if in the first stage they decide not to cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion.
                                                
9 This approach must be contrasted with the traditional cooperative game approach (e.g.  Chander and Tulkens, 1995,
1997) and with a repeated game approach (Barrett, 1994, 1997). Moreover, note that the regulatory approach often
proposed in public economics is not appropriate given the lack of a supranational authority.
10 An agreement is profitable if each cooperating player gets a payoff larger than the one he would get when no
agreement is signed. An agreement is stable if there is no incentive to free-ride and there is no incentive for other
countries to sign the agreement (see Carraro and Marchiori, 2002 for a survey of the theory of coalition stability).12
As said, in the business as usual game the following coalition structure forms
11:
(1) [(EU, JPN, FSU)a, EUR&D, JPNR&D, FSUR&D, USAa, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
namely EU, JPN and FSU cooperate to control GHG emissions, whereas the US free-ride; CHN and ROW
also play non-cooperatively. Note that the level of R&D expenditure is set non-cooperatively by all players.
If issue linkage is effective, i.e. the US accept to cooperate on both climate control and technology because
they do not want to loose the benefits arising from R&D cooperation, the following coalition structure forms:
(2) [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
where Annex B countries (EU, JPN, FSU and USA) cooperate on both issues. We will refer to this coalition
structure as the “joint coalition structure”. CHN and ROW set non cooperatively both their abatement level
and their R&D expenditure.
The comparison between (1) and (2) enables us to identify the first necessary condition. Issue linkage is
profitable to all Annex B countries if:
(3)  Pi[(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] >
Pi[(EU, JPN, FSU)a, EU R&D, JPN R&D, FSU R&D, USAa, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa R&D]
where Pi(.) denotes the welfare function of country  i and i = EU, JPN, FSU, USA. In words, the situation in
which Annex B countries cooperate on both climate and R&D is preferred by all countries to the situation in
which EU, JPN, FSU cooperate on climate, USA free-ride and no R&D cooperation takes place.
If the US cooperate on technology but free-ride on climate, the coalition structure is:
(4) [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)R&D,  (EU, JPN, FSU)a,  USAa, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
                                                
11 A coalition C is any non-empty subset of the player set N. A coalition structure p = {C1,C2, ... ,Cm} is a partition of
the player set N, i.e. Ci ˙ Cj = ˘ for i „ j and ¨
m
i=1Ci = N.13
This coalition structure leads to a second important group of conditions:
(5a) Pi[(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a,R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] >
Pi[(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)R&D, (EU, JPN, FSU)a, USAa, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D ] 
i = EU, JPN, FSU
(5b) PUSA[(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a,R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] <
PUSA[(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)R&D, (EU, JPN, FSU)a, USAa, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D ] 
Conditions (5a) and (5b) say that (EU, JPN, FSU) should prefer cooperation on both climate and R&D to
cooperation on R&D only, otherwise it would not be profitable for these players to propose the US a linked
cooperation on both issues. By contrast, the US should prefer to cooperate on R&D only, otherwise there
would be no need to introduce issue linkage because the US would find it profitable to cooperate on both
issues anyway. Therefore, (3) is the usual profitability or rationality condition, where (5a) and (5b) guarantee
that issue linkage is not a trivial situation which profits to all players.
Let us now focus on the stability of the joint agreement. If the US free-ride on either R&D cooperation or
climate cooperation (or on both), they loose all benefits because of issue linkage. Therefore, the following
coalition structure forms:
(6) [(EU, JPN, FSU)a, R&D,  USAa, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
As a consequence, the US have no incentive to free-ride (subject to issue linkage) if:
(7)  PUSA [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] >
PUSA [(EU, JPN, FSU)a, R&D,  USAa, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
The other Annex B countries, EU, JPN and FSU, are committed to climate cooperation. Therefore they can
only free-ride on R&D cooperation.  If the EU free-ride, the coalition structure is
(8) [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a,  (JPN, FSU, USA)R&D,  EUR&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]14
Therefore, the EU has no incentive to free ride on the joint agreement if:
(9) PEU [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] >
PEU [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a,  (JPN, FSU, USA)R&D,  EUR&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
Similar conditions must hold for JPN and FSU. As a consequence, the joint agreement is stable if (7), (9)
and:
(10) PJPN [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] >
PJPN [(EU, JPN, FSU, US)a ,  (EU, FSU, US)R&D,  JPNR&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
(11) PFSU [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] >
PFSU [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a ,  (EU, JPN, USA)R&D,  FSUR&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
are met. Let us recall that the stability condition (7) is conditional on the adoption of the issue linkage
strategy and on its credibility.
There is therefore a final important condition that must be checked for an issue linkage proposal – e.g. the
one in which climate and R&D cooperation are linked -- to be an effective tool to induce the US to
participate in the Kyoto agreement. This last condition is the credibility of the issue linkage proposal.
12 Is it
credible that the environmental coalition (EU, JPN, FSU) actually excludes the US from R&D cooperation if
the US do not comply with the Kyoto agreement?
To answer this question, we need to compare the payoffs under the coalition structures (4) and (6). The issue
linkage proposal is credible if:
(12)  Pi[(EU, JPN, FSU)a, R&D ,  USAa, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] >
Pi[(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)R&D, (EU, JPN, FSU)a,  USAa, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D]
i = EU, JPN, FSU
                                                
12 The issue of the credibility of the threat implicit in the issue linkage proposal has been raised by Tol et al. (2000).15
i.e. if EU, JPN and FSU prefer the situation in which they implement the threat implicit in the issue linkage
proposal to the situation in which they accept the US free-riding on climate but cooperate with the US on
R&D. If condition (12) is met, the threat implicit in the issue linkage proposal is credible. Indeed, were (12)
not satisfied, EU, JPN and FSU would prefer to maintain at least R&D cooperation with the US.
The above conditions (3) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12) are necessary and sufficient for the profitability and stability
of the coalition structure [(EU, JPN, FSU, USA)a, R&D, CHNa, R&D, ROWa, R&D] and for the credibility of the
threat upon which it is based. In the next section we will analyse from an empirical viewpoint whether the
above conditions are likely to be met.
4.  The role of issue linkage: some empirical evidence
In the next subsection, the main assumptions and the modelling framework which will be used to assess the
effectiveness of the issue linkage proposal will be described. In particular, the main features of the ETC-
RICE model will be highlighted. Then, in the following subsection, the assumptions about scenarios and
policy strategies will be implemented into the ETC-RICE model to check the validity of the profitability,
stability and credibility conditions presented above.
4.1  Main assumptions and modelling framework
The empirical part of this paper is based on optimisation results obtained using a version of Nordhaus’ RICE
model in which endogenous and induced technical change are modelled. In our version of Nordhaus’ model,
called ETC-RICE, technical change performs a twofold role: on the one hand, via increasing returns to scale,
it yields endogenous growth; on the other hand, by affecting the emission/output ratio, it accounts for the
adoption of cleaner and energy-saving technologies.
13 The ETC-RICE model has already been used in
Buonanno, Carraro,  Castelnuovo and Galeotti (2000),  Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2001) and in
Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo (2001). A brief description is contained in the Appendix.
In the model, six countries/regions (US, EU, JPN, FSU, China and ROW) optimally set the intertemporal
values of three strategic variables: investments, R&D expenditure and abatement rate. Given the
interdependency of countries’ decisions, the equilibrium value of these variables is the solution of a dynamic
open-loop Nash game between the six countries/regions.
As said, when a country commits to reduce its own GHG emissions, its abatement rate is such to achieve the
Kyoto target. By contrast, countries that do not comply with the Kyoto Protocol implement the welfare
                                                
13 This idea is supported by the existing empirical research on the environmental  Kuznets curves, which seems to
support the conclusion that economic growth is associated with a decreasing emission-output ratio (see Galeotti and
Lanza, 2001 for some recent results).16
maximising abatement rate (conditionally on the cooperative strategy of countries in the
Kyoto/Bonn/Marrakech coalition). Note that countries/regions which adhere to the Kyoto/Bonn/Marrakech
agreement are assumed to meet the Kyoto constraints from 2010 onward.
14 We thus adopt the so-called
“Kyoto forever” hypothesis ( Manne and  Richels, 2001). Therefore, our reference to the Kyoto/Bonn
agreement is partly imprecise since, for the sake of brevity, we will call “Kyoto Protocol” or
“Kyoto/Bonn/Marrakech agreement” a “Kyoto forever” scenario. This is already a standard practice adopted
in most economic analyses of climate policy.
As for the other strategic variables, they are optimally set by all countries. Those which belong to a coalition
maximise the coalition joint welfare. Those outside the coalition maximise their own individual welfare. This
is also true with respect to R&D expenditure, whose optimal value depends, among other things, upon the
international technological spillovers and the coalition (internal) technological spillovers.
It is important to clarify the role of spillovers in the model. In order to capture the idea that countries which
do not belong to the R&D coalition are excluded from the benefits produced by R&D cooperation, we add a
new parameter to the standard ETC-RICE model, denoted by  b. This parameter quantifies the increased
share of world knowledge which is appropriated by countries belonging to the R&D coalition. This
parameter is equivalent to the “differential technological  spillover” or  “coalition information exchange
coefficient” in the theoretical model by Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997).
Therefore, in the model there are two types of spillovers and related parameterisation. Spillovers,
parameterised by e, which are appropriated by all countries; and spillovers, parameterised by b, which are
beneficial only to coalition members.  As shown in the Appendix, technical change is induced by knowledge
accumulation, which is the sum of past R&D expenditures. We assume that part of the technological benefits
yielded by this knowledge accumulation are a global public good, whereas part of them are a club good that
can be appropriated only by the R&D coalition members. Given the crucial role of b in the analysis of the
effectiveness of issue linkage, we will explore how the empirical assessment of the theoretical conditions
described in the previous section depends on the value of b.
A final important assumption concerns the policy scenario. We will analyse the effectiveness of issue linkage
in inducing the US to comply with the Kyoto Protocol under the assumption that all GHG abatement is
carried out through domestic emission reduction policies. In other words, we analyse only the case in which
international emission trading is not allowed. The reason is the following one. Our goal is to check the
effectiveness of R&D issue linkage. To do this, we adopt the most favourable situation for issue linkage to
be effective. This situation is the one in which there is no international trading.
                                                
14 The use of the “Kyoto forever” hypothesis is a strong assumption. However, the CO2 concentration levels implicit in
this assumption (if RICE is a good description of the world) coincide with those in the A1B scenario (IPCC, 2001)
which can be considered the “median” scenario among those currently proposed.17
It is well known that an international trading scheme is a cost-effective way to reduce GHG emissions, i.e.
the cost of reducing emissions is lowest, if an international and competitive trading market is at work. At the
same time, recent studies have highlighted the strong impact of an international emission trading market on
R&D and technological innovation. In particular,  Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2001) show that an
international trading system, by lowering the cost of complying with the Kyoto targets, also lowers the
incentives to undertake environment-friendly R&D. Therefore, at the equilibrium, R&D expenditure is lower
in all countries that benefit from emission trading. Hence, R&D and emission trading are strategic
substitutes. As a consequence, countries have the largest incentive to attain the benefits yielded by R&D
cooperation when international emission trading is not allowed. The issue linkage proposal, which prevents
the US in attaining the R&D cooperation benefits if they do not comply with the Kyoto targets, is thus most
effective when the US need R&D and technological innovation to achieve the Kyoto targets. In other words,
we evaluate the impact of issue linkage in a situation in which environmentally committed countries (EU,
JPN and FSU) have the maximum possible amount of R&D to offer to convince the US to move back to the
Kyoto agreement.
4.2 Empirical analysis
Let us start by evaluating the non triviality of the issue linkage proposal. As formalised in eqs. (5a) and (5b),
this is the case when the environmental coalition (EU, JPN, FSU) prefers to cooperate on both climate and
R&D than to cooperate on R&D only. By contrast the US prefer cooperation only on  R&D.
Table 4 provides an empirical assessment of (5a) and (5b) both in the short run (the first commitment period)
and in the medium run (up to 2050). Table 4 shows that the issue linkage proposal is not trivial. In the short
run for b ‡ 0.66. In the medium run, for all values of b.
15  In particular, for these values of b, the US prefer to
cooperate only on R&D rather than on both climate and R&D.
The next question concerns the profitability of the issue linkage proposal. Is it convenient for all Annex B
countries to cooperate on both climate and R&D (with respect to the present situation)? The answer is
provided by Table 5, where the profitability condition (3) is assessed both in the short and in the medium
run.
Table 5 shows that, if b ‡ 0.66, all Annex B countries find it profitable to move from the current situation to
an international regime in which all Annex B countries cooperate on both GHG emission control and on
technological innovation and diffusion. Note that the country for which the profitability condition is most
                                                
15 For simplicity, in all tables we do not write the entire coalition structure but we omit developing countries (CHN and
ROW). The reason is that, as explained in section 3, these countries are assumed not to cooperate in all coalition
structures.18
difficult to be met is the US. In all other Annex B countries, the profitability of issue linkage is achieved for
all values of b. There are two reasons which explain this result.
Table 4. Non triviality of the issue linkage proposal.
First commitment period (1990-2010)
P[(USA, JPN, EU, SU)A,R&D] P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA 12.0621 12.0745 12.0897 12.1231 12.1524 12.1881 12.0808 12.0944 12.1096 12.1435 12.1730 12.2090
JPN 6.4105 6.4107 6.4111 6.4121 6.4133 6.4149 6.4084 6.4087 6.4090 6.4098 6.4107 6.4124
EU 14.9212 14.9281 14.9364 14.9549 14.9712 14.9908 14.9200 14.9264 14.9349 14.9533 14.9692 14.9891
FSU 1.8844 1.8845 1.8845 1.8847 1.8848 1.8850 1.8843 1.8844 1.8845 1.8846 1.8847 1.8849
P[(USA, JPN, EU, SU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA no No no no no no
JPN yes Yes yes yes yes yes
EU yes Yes yes yes yes yes
FSU yes Yes no yes yes yes
Medium term (1990-2050)
P[(USA, JPN, EU, SU)A,R&D] P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA 22.4161 22.4425 22.4741 22.5429 22.6031 22.6777 22.5083 22.5339 22.5665 22.6366 22.6952 22.7742
JPN 12.1728 12.1736 12.1757 12.1797 12.1843 12.1875 12.1704 12.1711 12.1725 12.1761 12.1788 12.1840
EU 27.9150 27.9287 27.9468 27.9862 28.0161 28.0618 27.9043 27.9185 27.9367 27.9758 28.0095 28.0506
FSU 3.8871 3.8872 3.8875 3.8879 3.8883 3.8887 3.8868 3.8870 3.8872 3.8876 3.8880 3.8884
P[(USA, JPN, EU, SU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA no No no no no no
JPN yes Yes yes yes yes yes
EU yes Yes yes yes yes yes
FSU yes Yes yes yes yes yes
P(.): payoffs (cumulated discounted consumption)
b: differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange coefficient
Firstly, the US move from a situation of no cooperation on both climate and R&D to a situation of
cooperation on both issues. The other countries already cooperate on GHG emission control. In particular,
the US, by leaving the situation in which they free-ride on climate control, start paying for abatement costs.19
Secondly, the US are characterised by high R&D expenditure levels. Therefore, when cooperating on R&D,
the US provide, via spillovers, important technological benefits to the other partners. As a consequence,
these partners, EU, JPN and FSU, achieve profitability even for low values of b.
Table 5. Profitability of the issue linkage proposal
First commitment period (1990-2010)
P[ (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA] P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA 12.1126 12.0621 12.0745 12.0897 12.1231 12.1524 12.1881
JPN 6.3642 6.4105 6.4107 6.4111 6.4121 6.4133 6.4149
EU 14.8579 14.9212 14.9281 14.9364 14.9549 14.9712 14.9908
FSU 1.8838 1.8844 1.8845 1.8845 1.8847 1.8848 1.8850
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[ (JPN, EU, FSU)A  USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA no No no yes yes yes
JPN yes Yes yes yes yes yes
EU yes Yes yes yes yes yes
FSU yes Yes yes yes yes yes
All no No no yes yes yes
Medium term (1990-2050)
P[ (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA] P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA 22.5259 22.4161 22.4425 22.4741 22.5429 22.6031 22.6777
JPN 12.1190 12.1728 12.1736 12.1757 12.1797 12.1843 12.1875
EU 27.8559 27.9150 27.9287 27.9468 27.9862 28.0161 28.0618
FSU 3.8860 3.8871 3.8872 3.8875 3.8879 3.8883 3.8887
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[ (JPN, EU, FSU)A  USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA no No no yes yes yes
JPN yes Yes yes yes yes yes
EU yes Yes yes yes yes yes
FSU yes Yes yes yes yes yes
All no No no yes yes yes
P(.): payoffs (cumulated discounted consumption)
b: differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange coefficient20
Now, let us analyse the free-riding incentives which could de-stabilise the joint agreement in which all
Annex B countries cooperate on both climate control and R&D. The US have no free-riding incentives if
condition (7) is met. The empirical assessment of condition (7) is shown in Table 6.
Table 6. U.S. incentives to free ride on the issue linkage proposal
First commitment period (1990-2010)
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] P[(JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D USAA,R&D]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA 12.0621 12.0745 12.0897 12.1231 12.1524 12.1881 12.0678 11.9631 12.0078 11.9719 12.0332 12.0229
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D USAA,R&D]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA no yes yes yes yes yes
Medium term (1990-2050)
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] P[(JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D USAA,R&D]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA 22.4161 22.4425 22.4741 22.5429 22.6031 22.6777 22.5172 22.3200 22.4452 22.3643 22.4379 22.5235
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D USAA,R&D]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
USA no yes yes yes yes yes
P(.): payoffs (cumulated discounted consumption)
b: differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange coefficient
Given that the profitability condition is met for b ‡ 0.66, it is important to explore the stability of the linked
agreement only for values of b ‡ 0.66. Table 6 actually shows that the US has no incentive to free-ride on the
coalition which cooperates on both climate and R&D when free-riding on either climate or R&D (or both)
implies the loss of the benefits arising from technological cooperation.
A similar conclusion holds for the other Annex B countries. By evaluating conditions (9), (10) and (11), we
conclude that no Annex B country has an incentive to free-ride on the linked agreement for values of  b ‡
0.66 (both in the short and in the medium run).
Our empirical analysis is summarised by Table 7, which shows for which values of b the profitability and
stability conditions are met.21





P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[ (JPN, EU, FSU)A  USAA] b ‡ 0.66 b ‡ 0.66
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D USA A,R&D] b ‡ 0.20 b ‡ 0.20
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A (USA, JPN, FSU)R&D EUR&D] b ‡ 0.10 b ‡ 0.10
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A (USA, EU, FSU)R&D JPNR&D] b ‡ 0.10 b ‡ 0.10
P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D] ‡ P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)A (USA, EU, JPN)R&D FSUR&D] b ‡ 0.10 b ‡ 0.10
P(.): payoffs (cumulated discounted consumption)
b: differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange coefficient
Therefore, the proposal of linking R&D cooperation with cooperation on climate change control is not
trivial, it is profitable, and above all it guarantees the stability of the linked agreement (no incentive to free-
ride once the linked agreement is signed).
However, is the issue linkage proposal credible? The answer depends on condition (12), which says that EU,
JPN and FSU should prefer to implement the threat implicit in the issue linkage proposal rather than
accepting the US free-riding on climate control and the US cooperation on technological innovation and
diffusion.
Unfortunately, our empirical results suggest that this last condition is unlikely to be met, i.e. the threat
implicit in the issue linkage proposal is unlikely to be credible. Table 8 demonstrates that, at least in the
medium run, the credibility condition is not met for all values of b, and in particular for all  b ‡ 0.66. The
situation is slightly more positive in the short run, where the credibility condition is met for b = 0.66.
Therefore, only in the short run and in a neighbourhood of the values of b for which the issue linkage
proposal is both profitable and stable, the credibility condition could be met.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The benefits from technological cooperation are much higher for
the EU, JPN, and above all the FSU, than for the US. Therefore, the EU, JPN and FSU suffer a bigger loss
when the issue linkage threat is implemented. In addition, the environmental benefits arising from
cooperation on climate change control are smaller, at least in the ETC-RICE model, than the technological
benefits from R&D cooperation. Therefore, EU, JPN and FSU prefer to loose the environmental benefits22
than the technological benefits, and thus accept the US free-riding on climate cooperation if the US
cooperate on R&D.
Table 8. Credibility of the issue linkage proposal
First commitment period (1990-2010)
P[(JPN, EU, SU)A,R&D USAA,R&D] P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
JPN 6.3711 6.4380 6.1892 6.4358 6.3480 6.1751 6.4084 6.4087 6.4090 6.4098 6.4107 6.4124
EU 14.5540 14.9548 14.8310 14.9629 14.9175 14.8674 14.9200 14.9264 14.9349 14.9533 14.9692 14.9891
FSU 1.8626 1.8849 1.8838 1.8850 1.8573 1.8840 1.8843 1.8844 1.8845 1.8846 1.8847 1.8849
P[(JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D USAA,R&D] ‡ P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A  USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
JPN no yes no yes no no
EU no yes no yes no no
FSU no yes no yes no no
Medium term (1990-2050)
P[(JPN, EU, SU)A,R&D USAA,R&D] P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
JPN 12.0942 12.1824 11.9787 12.1862 12.1073 12.0746 12.1704 12.1711 12.1725 12.1891 12.1788 12.1840
EU 27.6532 27.9117 27.8183 27.9313 27.9804 27.9072 27.9043 27.9185 27.9367 27.9758 28.0095 28.0506
FSU 3.8766 3.8866 3.8879 3.8869 3.8808 3.8890 3.8868 3.8870 3.8872 3.8876 3.8880 3.8894
P[(JPN, EU, FSU)A,R&D USAA,R&D] ‡ P[(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)R&D; (JPN, EU, FSU)A  USAA]
b 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.66 1.00 1.50
JPN no yes no no no no
EU no no no no no no
FSU no no yes no no no
P(.): payoffs (cumulated discounted consumption)
b: differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange coefficient
The above results therefore make the issue linkage proposal unlikely to be effective in inducing the US to
reconsider their decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. However, they open the way to another
policy strategy and to a different international regime on climate change control, which will be analysed in
the next section.23
5.  The environmental effectiveness of a climate regime based on technological cooperation
The results proposed in the previous section provide little support to a policy strategy structured around the
linkage between climate and R&D negotiations. Even if “issue linkage” proves to be effective in inducing a
profitable and stable coalition structure, in which all Annex B countries cooperate on both climate and R&D,
the conclusion is not in favour of “issue linkage”. The reason, as explained above, is that the R&D issue
linkage proposal is based on an implicit non credible threat (Tol et al. 2000). Countries like the EU, JPN and
FSU prefer to cooperate with the US on technological innovation and diffusion, even when the US free-ride
on climate cooperation.
This latter result shows a strong incentive to technological cooperation among Annex B countries. Therefore,
it may be linked to recent proposals highlighting the idea that technological cooperation can be the
appropriate tool to deal with the global warming problem
16.
In particular, Barrett (2001) argues that the Kyoto Protocol provides poor incentives for participation and
compliance. He also argues that an alternative climate regime could be structured as follows. A cooperative
funding of basic Research and Development with respect to energy-saving, environment-friendly
technologies on the one hand, and the implementation of various standards directed towards the world-wide
adoption and diffusion of new technologies on the other.
Barrett emphasises that this approach -- based on a R&D Protocol with complementary standards protocols --
derives its attractiveness from the inclusion of both “push” incentives affecting the supply of R&D and
“pull” incentives aimed at the demand for the fruits of R&D. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol does not
consider the necessity to push R&D, but only the pull incentives. By also focussing on incentives related to
the funding of R&D, preconditions for long-term technical innovation and diffusion are created. Moreover,
this approach does not require the enforcement of compliance, while providing incentives for participation.
Note that, the more countries to adopt a standard, the more attractive it becomes for other countries to adopt
the same standard. This highlights the strategic advantage of Barrett’s idea. A further advantage consists in
the avoidance of leakage and free-riding: non-participants cannot use the products of collective R&D in
order to reduce their emissions more cheaply.
17
In this section, we do not want to discuss the many pros and cons of Barrett’s (2001) proposal. We would
rather explore whether:
(a)  there are actually the incentives for R&D cooperation to be implemented by Annex B countries, namely
the coalition in which Annex B countries cooperate only on technological innovation and diffusion is
profitable and stable;
                                                
16 See for example Barrett (2001), Edmonds, Roop and Scott (2000), Edmonds (2001), Flannery (2001), Jacoby (1998).
17 The focus on R&D and on long-term incentives does not undermine the Kyoto process but could even be incorporated under the
UNFCCC. In particular, the Kyoto agreement could be imbedded in Barrett’s approach.24
(b)  cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion, without cooperation on GHG emission
abatement, is also environmental effective, i.e. reducing global emissions.
(c)  this latter conclusion holds, if not when Annex B countries cooperate on R&D, at least when all world
countries cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion, i.e. when a global coalition forms.
These three issues can be explored by using the ETC-RICE model, because in this model R&D expenditure
is one of countries’ strategic variables and because accumulated knowledge (the sum of past R&D
expenditures) affects both economic growth and the emission/output ratio. In addition, the presence of
internal spillovers makes R&D cooperation increasingly profitable (profitability increases with the parameter
b, as seen in the previous section, and with the number of signatories).
In this section, we present an empirical assessment of two possible scenarios: the first one is characterised by
technological cooperation among the four “traditional” Kyoto countries/regions (USA, EU, JPN, FSU),
while the second one features the grand coalition where all world countries cooperate on technological
innovation and diffusion. For each scenario, we assess the profitability, stability and environmental
effectiveness of technological cooperation.
Our results can be summarised as follows. As expected, and as suggested by economic theory (Yi, 1997), the
coalition in which either Annex B countries or all countries cooperate only on R&D is profitable and stable
for values of b ‡ 0.2. Therefore, as soon as the excludable benefits arising from technological cooperation
become relevant (b ‡ 0.2), all countries find it profitable to cooperate. In addition, there is no incentive to
free-ride on technological cooperation. Again, the reason lies in the presence of economic benefits
(parameterised by  b) that can be appropriated only by coalition members (this also captures Barrett’ s
argument about technological standards).
The crucial issue is therefore the environmental effectiveness of a coalition in which member countries
cooperate on R&D only. Our results are summarised in Tables 9 and 10. The first column shows different
values of the parameter b, which parameterises technological spillovers internal to the coalition. The second
column contains the change of global emissions when R&D cooperation is implemented with respect to
global emissions in the current situation in which EU, JPN and FSU fulfil the Kyoto target, the other
countries free-ride on climate cooperation and no technological cooperation is implemented. The third
column contains the change of the emission/output ratio induced by R&D cooperation (again with respect to
the current situation). While the second and the third columns show the results in the first commitment
period (1990-2010), the fourth and the fifth columns show what could happen in the medium term (1990-
2050).
Table 9 illustrates that both global emissions and the emission/output ratio increase when Annex B countries
cooperate only on R&D. Note that there are no cases in which technological cooperation can induce a
reduction of global emissions and/or of the emission/output ratio (at least as far as the ETC-RICE model can
adequately capture the dynamics of induced technical change) .25
Table 9. Environmental effectiveness of technological cooperation between Annex B countries
Technological cooperation between Annex B countries vs. environmental cooperation

















0.10 + 12.96% + 13.09% + 49.18% + 48.98%
0.20 + 12.97% + 12.99% + 48.28% + 47.99%
0.33 + 12.97% + 12.88% + 48.87% + 48.42%
0.66 + 13.01% + 12.68% + 48.60% + 47.83%
1.00 + 13.07% + 12.53% + 48.46% + 47.40%
1.50 + 13.13% + 12.35% + 48.18% + 46.88%
            b: differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange coefficient
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As a consequence of the intensified R&D efforts, production
increases. This raises the emissions of the Annex B countries that cooperate on R&D. Emissions per unit of
output also increase because the overall impact of accumulated R&D expenditure on economic growth (the
endogenous growth effect) is larger than the impact of accumulated R&D on emission abatement (the
induced technical change effect).
These negative conclusions on the environmental effectiveness of an international regime based only on
technological cooperation are even stronger when looking at the situation in 2050. Both absolute emissions
and the aggregate emissions/output ratio increase by almost 50% with respect to the current post Bonn
situation in which only EU, JPN and FSU are committed to comply with the Kyoto target
18.
The reason is that the effects of the increased investments in R&D can be seen more clearly in 2050 than in
2010. An important additional reason is that in the medium term technological spillovers have a strong effect
on the growth rate of CHN and ROW (which do not participate in the technological agreement and therefore
get part of the benefits at no cost).
                                                
18 The reason for this drastic increase is that we compare a situation in which the European Union, Japan and Russia are committed to
strict, binding emission reduction targets (due to our use of the “Kyoto forever” assumption) with a situation which is characterised
by no mandatory emission reduction targets.26
Can more satisfactory conclusions be achieved if a global technological cooperation, which involves all
world countries, be established? Again, even though global cooperation increases the economic benefits and
the environmental effectiveness of the agreement, total emissions in the new regime – in which countries
cooperate only on technological innovation and diffusion -- increase with respect to total emissions in the
current regime (see Table 10). The increase of emissions is smaller when all world regions cooperate to
develop and diffuse climate-friendly technologies with respect to the case in which developing countries free
ride. However, the hypothesis that a policy which fosters technological cooperation can also induce less
GHG emissions is not supported by our results.
Table 10. Environmental effectiveness of global technological cooperation

















0.10 + 2.15% + 1.70% + 9.65% + 8.79%
0.20 + 2.19% + 1.67% + 9.73% + 8.85%
0.33 + 2.24% + 1.64% + 10.14% + 9.23%
0.66 + 2.30% + 1.54% + 9.48% + 8.55%
1.00 + 2.35% + 1.44% + 10.06% + 8.95%
1.50 + 2.40% + 1.36% + 9.78% + 8.57%
b: differential technological spillover or coalition information exchange coefficient
Also note that, at least in the short run (Table 9), higher internal R&D spillovers lead to higher overall
emissions and higher emissions per unit of output. Again, the reason is that an enhanced technological
cooperation pushes economic growth and increases welfare, but also increases emissions. This latter increase
is only partly mitigated by the participation of CHN and ROW, where the emission-output ratio improves,
thus lowering the global increase of emissions (Table 10).
Even though the rate of growth of emissions per unit of output becomes smaller as a consequence of
increased R&D efforts -- which demonstrates that technological cooperation induces a relative
environmental improvement of production technologies -- our analysis does not seem to support the idea that27
a coalition devoted only to technological cooperation can also have a positive impact on climate change
control.
Therefore, the tentative conclusion is that technological cooperation cannot replace environmental
cooperation. Within the limits of the ETC-RICE, our optimisation experiments suggest that technological
cooperation increases R&D, growth and welfare, but also emissions. As a consequence, some environmental
policy measures, to be coupled with technological cooperation, may be necessary. These measures could also
provide additional incentives to invest in climate friendly technological change.
Some results, already discussed in Section 4, provide support to this last statement. Indeed, total emissions
when all or part of the Annex B countries adopt technological cooperation  and environmental policy
measures to achieve the Kyoto targets, are smaller than total emissions when international cooperation
concerns only technological innovation and diffusion. Moreover, with both technological and climate
cooperation, global emissions are smaller than the global Kyoto target itself.
Therefore, a mix of climate and technological cooperation seems to provide the best equilibrium outcome.
However, this policy mix can hardly be achieved on a voluntary basis, unless the US climate policy strategy
recognises the benefits arising from combining technological  and climate cooperation.
6.  Conclusions
A large cooperation on global environmental issues is difficult to achieve because of the public nature of the
global environment that creates strong incentives to free-ride. This problem, often highlighted in the game-
theoretic and economic literature, is also confirmed by recent events in climate policy. The most obvious
example is the US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
The US defection induces serious environmental and economic problems, ranging from a deterioration of the
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol to the increase in Russia’s bargaining power. Therefore, it
is crucial to investigate whether an incentive strategy indeed exists that can induce the US to revise their
decision and to comply with the Kyoto commitments.
One solution often proposed in the literature on international regimes is to link cooperation on climate
change control (typically a public good) with cooperation on a club or quasi-club good. In this paper, we
have considered the linkage of climate cooperation with technological cooperation. The idea is that the
incentives to appropriate R&D cooperation benefits, which can be obtained only by cooperating also on
climate change control, could offset the incentives to free-ride on the environmental dimension.
Our analysis does not seem to provide empirical support to the issue linkage proposal. Linkage between
climate and R&D cooperation does not seem to be an effective strategy to induce the US to move back to
Kyoto. Even though the coalition structure in which all Annex B cooperate on both dimensions (climate and
R&D) is profitable, the issue linkage proposal is based on an implicit non-credible threat. Countries like the28
European Union, Japan and Russia prefer to cooperate with the US on technological innovation and diffusion
even when the US free-ride on climate cooperation.
The strong preference for technological cooperation among Annex B countries that emerges from our
analysis indicates that another climate regime, recently proposed in literature, should be explored. This
climate regime is based on the idea that a cooperation focussed only on R&D innovation and diffusion,
without any binding abatement commitment, could be the appropriate tool to deal with the global warming
problem. However, our results suggest that technological cooperation without environmental cooperation
cannot yield lower global GHG emissions, even though it increases growth and welfare.
As in previous papers (e.g. Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo, 2001), our results must be taken cautiously.
This paper aims at identifying economic mechanisms and  feedbacks, rather than providing precise
quantitative assessments of the implications of different climate regimes. The structure of the ETC-RICE
model, albeit simple, clearly identifies the numerous effects that must be taken into account when comparing
alternative climate policies and international regimes. The role of endogenous and induced technical change
is shown to be very important. The use of strategic R&D investments and R&D cooperation open new
possibilities to climate policy. This paper has explored these possibilities by taking into account the
economic mechanisms behind endogenous growth, climate-friendly innovation, international R&D spillovers
and the possibility to exclude (at least partially) some countries from fully enjoying the benefits of these
spillovers (RJVs and patents are obvious tools).
The above set of economic mechanisms has been parameterised. As a consequence, the results are sensitive
to this parameterisation, even though a sensitivity analysis with respect to the most important parameter --
the coalition information exchange coefficient -- has been carried out. The conclusions of our study are not
in favour of R&D issue linkage, or of R&D cooperation alone, as ways to replace the Kyoto Protocol to curb
GHG emissions. However, these conclusions should be tested using other models and other specifications of
technical change.
Nonetheless, our results suggest that the technological dimension remains a very important feature of any
climate policy, and that R&D cooperation can be an important complement to the Kyoto Protocol.29
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Appendix. The ETC-RICE model with international
technology diffusion and differential technological spillovers.
The ETC-RICE model with differential technological spillovers (or coalition information exchange benefits)
is an extension of Nordhaus and Yang’s (1996) regional RICE model of integrated assessment, which is one
of the most popular and manageable integrated assessment tools for the study of climate change (see, for
instance, Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2001). It is basically a single sector optimal growth model which has been
extended to incorporate the interactions between economic activities and climate. One such model has been
developed for each macro region into which the world is divided (USA, Japan, Europe, China, Former Soviet
Union, and Rest of the World).
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and emission abatement
that maximise the present value of per capita consumption. Output (net of climate change) is used for
investment and consumption and is produced according to a constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology,
which combines the inputs from capital and labour with the level of technology. Population (taken to be
equal to full employment) and technology levels grow over time in an exogenous fashion, whereas capital
accumulation is governed by the optimal rate of investment. There is a wedge between output gross and net
of climate change effects, the size of which is dependent upon the amount of abatement (rate of emission
reduction) as well as the change in global temperature. The model is completed by three equations
representing emissions (which are related to output and abatement), carbon cycle (which relates
concentrations to emissions), and climate module (which relates the change in temperature relative to 1990
levels to carbon concentrations) respectively.
In our extension of the model, technical change is no longer exogenous. Instead, the issue of endogenous
technical change is tackled by following the ideas contained in both  Nordhaus (1997) and  Goulder and
Mathai (2000) and accordingly modifying Nordhaus and Yang’s (1996) RICE model. Doing so requires the
input of a number of additional parameters, some of which have been estimated using information provided
by  Coe and  Helpman (1995), while the remaining parameters were calibrated so as to reproduce the
Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenario generated by the RICE model with exogenous technical change.
In particular, the following factors are included: first, endogenous technical change affecting factor
productivity is introduced. This is done by adding the stock of knowledge in each production function and by
relating the stock of knowledge to R&D investments. Second, induced technical change is introduced, by
allowing the stock of knowledge to affect also the emission-output ratio. Finally, international technological
spillovers are also modelled.
Within each version of the model, countries play a non-cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting, which
yields an Open Loop Nash equilibrium (see Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2001, for an explicit derivation of first
order conditions of the optimum problem). This is a situation in which, in each region, the planner
maximises social welfare subject to the individual resource and capital constraints and the climate module,33
given the emission and investment strategies (in the base case) and the R&D expenditure strategy (in the
ETC case) of all other players.
The Standard Model without Induced Technical Change
As said above, it is assumed for the purpose of this model that innovation is brought about by R&D spending
which contributes to the accumulation of the stock of existing knowledge. Following an approach pioneered
by  Griliches (1979, 1984), it is assumed that the stock of knowledge is a factor of production, which
therefore enhances the rate of productivity (see also the discussion in Weyant, 1997; Weyant and  Olavson,
1999). Thus, in this formulation, R&D efforts prompt non-environmental technical progress, but with
different modes and elasticities. More precisely, the RICE production function output is modified as follows:
] ) , ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
1 g g b - = t n K t n L t n K t n A t n Q F R
n     (1)
where Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of technology and KR, L,
and KF are respectively the inputs from knowledge capital, labour, and physical capital.
In (1), the stock of knowledge has a region-specific output elasticity equal to bn (n=1,…6). It should be noted
that, as long as this coefficient is positive, the output production process is characterised by increasing
returns to scale, in line with current theories of endogenous growth. This implicitly assumes the existence of
cross-sectoral technological spillovers within each country (Romer, 1990). In addition, it should be noted
that while allowing for R&D-driven technological progress, we maintain the possibility that technical
improvements can also be determined exogenously (the path of A is the same as that specified in the original
RICE model). The stock accumulates in the usual fashion:
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( & ) 1 , ( t n K t n D R t n K R R R d - + = +     (2)
where R&D is the expenditure in Research and Development and dR is the rate of knowledge depreciation.
Finally, it is recognised that some resources are absorbed by R&D spending. That is:
) , ( & ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t n D R t n I t n C t n Y + + =     (3)
where Y is output net of climate change effects (specified just as in the RICE model), C is consumption and I
gross fixed capital formation.
At this stage the model maintains the same emissions function as Nordhaus’ RICE model which will be
modified in the next section:34
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where s can be loosely defined as the emissions-output ratio, E stands for emissions and m for the rate of
abatement effort. The policy variables included in the model are rates of fixed investment and of emission
abatement. For the other variables, the model specifies a time path of  exogenously given values.
Interestingly, this is also the case for technology level A and of the emissions-output ratio s. Thus, the model
presented so far assumes no induced technical change, i.e. an exogenous environmental technical change,
and a formulation of productivity that evolves both exogenously and endogenously. In the model, investment
fosters economic growth (thereby driving up emissions) while abatement is the only policy variable used for
reducing emissions.
Induced Technical Change
In the second step of our model formulation, endogenous environmental technical change is accounted for. It
is assumed that the stock of knowledge – which in the previous formulation was only a factor of production -
also serves the purpose of reducing,  ceteris paribus, the level of carbon emissions. Thus, in the second
formulation, R&D efforts prompt both environmental and non-environmental technical progress, although
with different modes and elasticities.
19 More precisely, the RICE emission-output relationship is modified as
follows:
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In (4’), knowledge reduces the emissions-output ratio with an elasticity of an, which is also region-specific;
the parameter cn is a scaling coefficient, whereas sn is the value to which the emission-output ratio tends
asymptotically as the stock of knowledge increases without limit. In this formulation, R&D contributes to
output productivity on the one hand, and affects the emission-output ratio - and therefore the overall level of
pollution emissions - on the other one.
Knowledge Spillovers
Previous formulations do not include potential spillovers effects produced by knowledge, and therefore
ignore the fact that both technologies and organisational structures diffuse internationally. Modern
economies are linked by vast and continually expanding flows of trade, investment, people and ideas. The
technologies and choices of one region are and will inevitably be affected by developments in other regions.
                                                
19 Obviously, we could have introduced two different types of R&D efforts, respectively contributing to the growth of
an environmental knowledge stock and a production knowledge stock. Such undertaking however is made difficult by
the need of specifying variables and calibrating parameters for which there is no immediately available and sound
information in the literature.35
Following Weyant and Olavson (1999), who suggest that the definition of spillovers in the induced technical
change context be kept plain and simple - in light of a currently incomplete understanding of the problem -
disembodied, or knowledge, spillovers are modelled (see Romer, 1990). They refer to the R&D carried out
and paid for by one party that produces benefits to other parties which then have better or more inputs than
before or can somehow benefit from R&D carried out elsewhere. Therefore, in order to capture international
knowledge spillovers, the stock of world knowledge is introduced in the third version of the ETC-RICE
model, both in the production function and in the emission-output ratio equation.
This formulation enables us to introduce differential technological spillovers, i.e. the coalition information
exchange coefficient  b, in a simple manner. This parameter determines the level of additional world
knowledge from which the regions in the same R&D coalition can benefit. Equations (1) and (4’) are then
revised as follows:
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is defined in such a way as not to include a country’s own stock and where b  is the coalition information
exchange coefficient ( 0 > b ).